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Abstract We investigate the impact of outward Foreign Direct Investments (FDI)
on the Multinational Corporations technological leadership, meant as the capacity of
entering and remaining among the top Research & Development (R&D) world
investors. The research hypotheses are formulated by distinguishing FDI in R&D
from FDI in other economic activities. The findings support our hypotheses with
respect to the top R&D circles of the European Industrial Research and Innovation
Scoreboard. Increasing the number of FDI projects in R&D makes the entrance in
these circles more probable. The same holds true for non-R&D FDI, but with a
lower impact. The number of R&D–FDI also reduces the probability of exiting from
the circles, while that of non-R&D ones does not. These results are robust when the
value of FDI projects in R&D is considered, apart from their impact on the exit from
the circles, which appears to vanish. Although with caveats, the policy support to
R&D internationalization provides companies with a sustainable competitive
advantage in the race for the most substantial R&D investments and for the entailed
economic and financial benefits.
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1 Introduction
In the current global scenario, populated by Multinational Corporations (MNCs)
operating in an array of markets and technologies, innovation performances depend
also and above all on the capacity of sourcing knowledge internationally and of
exploiting it in production activities on a worldwide basis. Foreign Direct
Investments (FDI), mainly but not only in Research & Development (R&D), are
crucial in this last respect. They allow firms to expand their markets, enter into
global value chains, interact with foreign business players and labs, get embeddeded
in the scientific communities of the host country, and thus tap into its set of
knowledge and competencies (Maskell et al. 2007).
Within this realm, the original focus of the paper resides in the effects that FDI
have on the firm’s capacity of outperforming its rivals in terms of R&D investments.
As we will claim in the following, this is a crucial domain of competition for the
technological leadership at the worldwide level, from which firms can gain
important financial and economic gains. Furthermore, as we will also argue, the
chances of success in this competitive process can be positively affected by the
firms’ decisions to invest abroad, although to an extent which depends on the
activities FDI occur in. Accordingly, the paper identifies an additional sphere on
which internationalization policies can intervene in order to foster the firms’
competitiveness.
In spite of its relevance, the present research question has been overshadowed by
the attention for the motivations that lead firms to invest abroad [see Franco et al.
(2010) for a critical review]. In particular, the role of FDI driven by the search of
new knowledge [‘‘knowledge seeking’’ or ‘‘technology seeking’’ FDI Cantwell
(1989)] has been singled out, especially through the internationalization of R&D
activities.1 Important results have also been obtained about the impact of these FDI
on the firm’s innovative and economic performance (e.g. Subramaniam and
Venkatraman 2001; Penner and Shaver 2005).
The analysis of FDI for the firm’s capacity of taking the technological leadership
over its rivals on a worldwide scale has been instead limited2 and affected by some
crucial methodological choices. First of all, it has mainly focused on the ‘‘outcome’’
of the race for the technological leadership, as it might be revealed by the patent
specialization of the competing firms in some crucial technology fields for
innovating in their sectors (e.g. Cantwell and Andersen 1996). In so doing, the
resources and the mechanisms through which firms get able to reach such
specialization advantages have remained under-investigated. Secondly, in the few
studies which have addressed the FDI-R&D relationship, leaders and followers have
been distinguished on the basis of exogenously chosen statistical moments (e.g.
mean and/or median) of their R&D intensity (e.g. Alca´cer and Chung 2007). In this
way, firms with a higher (e.g. than the mean) R&D intensity are easily distinguished
1 Among the several works on the trends and drivers of R&D internationalization, see Patel and Pavitt
(1991), Granstrand et al. (1993), Cantwell and Piscitello (2000), Gammeltoft (2006), Kinkel and Som
(2012), Castelli and Castellani (2013).
2 Relevant exceptions are represented by Naghavi and Ottaviano (2009) and Belderbos et al. (2008).
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from those with a lower intensity among those which invest abroad, and scale
effects are ruled out from the analysis (e.g. by relating R&D to sales or
employment). However, in so doing the sight is unfortunately lost of two important
issues: (1) the volume of the R&D expenditures firms can afford to invest in; (2) the
‘endogenous’ thresholds to overcome in order to stay among the leaders, depending
on the R&D capacity of the relevant players.
Filling the previous gaps represents the main motivation of the present paper, in
which we put forward some research hypotheses about the impact of FDI on the
MNCs’ technological leadership in terms of R&D expenditure. In the application of
the paper, we then provide an empirical test of these hypotheses, by looking at the
European Industrial and R&D Scoreboard. More precisely, subsequent releases of
this Scoreboard are merged and the resulting panel is integrated with fDi Market
data, in order to see the role of FDI in enabling the firms to enter, and eventually
stay, in the circle of the top R&D Scoreboard companies. Drawing eclectically from
the industrial organization literature, we model the competition for this circle
through a sort of entry/exit model. The boundaries of this circle are first determined
by looking at the distribution of the R&D investment capacity of companies at the
worldwide level. FDI are then plugged into the model among the explicatives that
can account for the propensity firms have to entry in and exit from such a circle.
As the Scoreboard companies are typically large conglomerates, operating in
several international markets, which together account for more than 80 % of the
total world R&D, their analysis represents a natural point of departure in searching
for the circle of top R&D investors among them. As much natural will be, in our
future research agenda, the extension of this analysis to those companies that are out
of the scoreboard domain, and which could eventually use their FDIs to reach ‘‘the
foot of the R&D giants’’.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 illustrates the
theoretical background and presents the main research hypothesis of the paper.
Section 3 describes the model through which we test this hypothesis and the
employed dataset. Section 4 discusses the estimation results. Section 5 concludes
and draws some policy implications.
2 Theoretical background
2.1 R&D leaders and R&D top spenders
The fact that firms compete also and above all through their innovations has
attracted a lot of attention in economic and management studies, especially along
the Schumpeterian tradition. A number of drivers have been identified for firms to
emerge as technological leaders in their markets and to build up a competitive
advantage on this leadership (Teece 2006). The mastery of core capabilities—
‘dynamic’ ones, in particular (Teece and Pisano 1994)—and the control of
‘complementary assets’ (Teece 1986)—in marketing, distribution, and manufactur-
ing, for example—have appeared crucial to complement what remains however the
key innovation input: that is, the firm’s capacity to invest in R&D. In strategic
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management and in business studies the debate on the technological leadership of
firms has in fact focused on the gains that R&D leaders have with respect to R&D
followers. Drawing on and extending the conceptual framework of Caves and Porter
(1977), these advantages have been identified in a mix of (1) knowledge-spillovers,
(2) product differentiation, and (3) economies of scope. In parallel, the economic
literature on innovation races spurred by the work of Reinganum (1985) has shown
that a larger R&D spending is a source of higher monopoly rents and future
performance, although with different outcomes between incumbents and new
entrants of a sector. Finally, in the accounting literature on R&D evaluation, R&D
leaders have been found to earn significant future excess returns on the R&D
followers, even aside from their use for risk compensation (Lev et al. 2006).
In all of these studies, R&D leadership is captured through some proxy of the
firm’s R&D intensity, like the ratio of R&D expenditure to sales, or to the market
value of equity. As is well known, this is motivated by the intent of getting rid of
size effects and focusing on the importance that R&D has with respect to the
business scale of the firm. In this vein, large R&D spenders are those which invest
the most of their resources in R&D, but not necessarily those which invest the
largest amount of money in R&D, or in the largest R&D projects.
However, being among the largest R&D spenders of an economic sector in
absolute terms could provide important advantages too. On the stock market, the
amount of firm’s R&D expenditures has an important signaling value for the
investors: not only it signals a higher volatility of its future earnings, but also the
reputation and capacity of dealing with important technological breakthroughs (Hall
and Oriani 2006; Cincera et al. 2009). In real markets, instead, targeting the group
of the largest R&D spenders can increase the probability of the firm to overcome
sectoral thresholds in the relative expenditures, which make the R&D investment a
‘‘dilemma’’ (Gonza´lez and Pazo´ 2004). Under a certain absolute level, the output
effect of investing could in fact be insufficient to recover its costs, given the
presence of indivisibilities in R&D (a la Arrow), for instance, the fixed costs of
research labs, the specialization required for an efficient team research work, and
the pool of research projects for an adequate sharing of their risk. Top R&D
investors will instead be able to run research projects of a larger average scale, with
higher opportunities of international economies of scale, and a higher capacity of
overcoming the up-front fixed costs and the indivisibilities from which path-
breaking innovations are usually affected (Godoe 2000; Cohen 2010). The largest
R&D investors can also be expected to have a wider and more diversified
knowledge-base, through which they could be able to deal with a larger portfolio of
innovation projects and have higher opportunities of risk pooling, although with a
more demanding organisational governance (Gerybadze and Reger 1999; Mikkola
2001). Increasing the size of R&D investments above that of the majority of the
rivals can also make R&D an effective barrier to entry, from which firms can benefit
in a Schumpeterian fashion, when targeting a major (radical) process or product
innovation (Mueller and Tilton 1969). Last, but not least, their capacity of scanning,
accessing and combining external knowledge sources—that is, the second face of
their ‘‘large R&D’’ (Cohen and Levinthal 1990)—could be arguably larger too, with
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higher chances of managing research cooperation in an open-innovation fashion
(Enkel et al. 2009).
All in all, looking at top R&D spenders provides relevant information for the
analysis of technological leadership. On the other hand, we cast some doubts on the
methodological choices that the extant literature usually makes for distinguishing
R&D leaders from the followers. In general, this is done by calibrating the
distinction for the competitive forces operating within a certain industry and by
referring to some kind of industry-adjusted R&D intensity. Firms whose R&D
intensity is greater than (less than or equal to) the benchmark R&D intensity for the
industry are classified as R&D leaders (followers). Different weighted and/or
unweighted averages are used to define the benchmark (Lev et al. 2006; Alca´cer and
Chung 2007). This approach enables one to consider the sector-specific nature of
R&D leaders/followers (i.e. R&D followers of some sector could be leaders in
another, and vice versa). However, it neglects that the race for R&D (and
innovation) spans also across the boundaries of the firm’s main economic activity.
On the one hand, firms generally invest in a much wider spectrum of technologies
than those which pertain to their production realm (Brusoni et al. 2001). On the
other hand, the largest R&D expenditures are carried out by conglomerates which
operate in a number of economic sectors, making the industry calibration of their
R&D leadership even less accurate. The relative position that a firm reveals with
respect to its world R&D rivals, rather than to industry rivals as such, could be
equally important to ascertain its eventual R&D leadership. Furthermore, rather than
identifying such a position through a standard and exogenously given momentum
(e.g. the median of the ranking), it could be interesting to see whether the
competition for the largest R&D investments endogenously determines some
thresholds of expenditure which firms shall overcome to become leaders. In so
doing, the status of R&D leader is more directly related to the firm’s capacity of
outperforming its rivals in front of the ‘R&D dilemma’: that is, in accessing the
‘club’ of those R&D spenders which can bear the up-front costs for the most
impacting R&D activities. As we will claim in the following, FDI can have a role in
fostering such a capacity.
2.2 FDI and the competition for (higher) R&D expenditure
The relationship between FDI and R&D is a complex one. On the one hand, R&D
activities can be claimed to provide firms with a number of advantages for
becoming (more) multinational: both direct advantages, like those pointed out by
the standard OLI (ownership, location, internationalization) paradigm (Dunning
1977); and indirect ones, such as the R&D productivity premium that firms can
exploit for investing abroad, pointed out by the new literature on heterogeneity in
trade and FDI (Helpman et al. 2004). On the other hand, FDI can have an impact on
the firm’s R&D in turn, as is shown by the role of MNCs in accounting for the
volumes of R&D investments worldwide and for their internationalization
(UNCTAD 2005; UNESCO 2010). This complexity makes the relationship at
stake a dynamic interaction with potential reverse causality, which could be a source
of endogeneity problems (Reeb et al. 2012).
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Paying particular attention to this problem, in the paper we focus on the impact
that FDI can have on the firm’s level of R&D expenditure. Such an impact is
apparently straightforward when we look at the international investments that the
literature has called knowledge (or technology) seeking (Cantwell 1989; Patel and
Vega 1999). These are a specific version of the ‘‘strategic-asset-seeking’’ FDI
identified by the seminal taxonomy of Dunning (1993) and are mainly, though not
exclusively, represented by FDI in R&D (Castelli and Castellani 2013). Through
these FDI, MNCs can tap into the technological knowledge of the host country and
catch-up with companies at the global frontier—when they actually lag behind
(Pearce 1999; Niosi 1999)—but also sustain their eventual technological leadership
by renewing their knowledge-base (Cantwell and Janne 1999; Chung and Alca´cer
2002). ‘‘Home-base augmenting’’ MNCs, which tap into new knowledge abroad to
develop technologies and products that serve, not only the host market, but also the
home and the global ones, are gaining importance with respect to the traditional
‘‘home-base exploiting’’ ones (Cantwell and Mudambi 2005; Ambos et al. 2006).
Accordingly, knowledge seeking can also occur between countries whose differ-
ences in technological levels and R&D intensity are small. For this reason, although
the level of development of the host country remains important for the firms’
location choice and the associated impact (Hall 2011), the analysis of the firm’s FDI
in R&D can be of relevance even disregarding their destination, as we actually do in
the paper.
The internationalization of R&D via FDI has received a lot of attention. Several
studies have concentrated on the effects it has on the inventive capacity of the
investing firms, for example in terms of patents production and/or citation (e.g.
Penner and Shaver 2005; Criscuolo et al. 2005). Another stream of the literature
have focused on the effects of R&D internationalization on the introduction of
innovative products (Subramaniam and Venkatraman 2001; Naghavi and Ottaviano
2009).3
The impact that the internationalization of R&D has on R&D expenditure as such
has instead been less investigated. FDI in R&D have been shown to make this
expenditure more geographically footloose, if not even to change the patterns of
innovation specialization of the investing firms (Hall 2011). More relevant for our
research question is a different strand of literature, which has looked at the level of
investments of MNCs compared to national firms. The empirical evidence reported
in these works shows that multinational activities appear to increase the firm’s
propensity to invest in both tangible and intangible assets, and the scale of these
investments too (Egger and Pfaffermayr 2009): a result that extends also to the
expenditures firms incur for setting up new R&D plants and equipments and for
obtaining new R&D knowledge. In both respects, the possibility that FDI crowds
out the firm’s domestic expenditures in R&D is in general excluded (Desai et al.
3 In general, a positive innovation impact of the firm’s R&D internationalization is not guaranteed and
rather depends on a set of aspects. The complementarity between the technological base of the home and
of the host country, the techno-economic characteristics (e.g. opportunity and appropriability conditions)
of the industries in which they operate, the individual traits of the companies investing abroad, among
which their capabilities of interacting and networking with the foreign providers, have appeared crucial
(Chung and Alca´cer 2002; Song et al. 2011; Ambos 2005; Piscitello and Santangelo 2011).
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2009). For a simple cost-benefit motivation, the decision to locate R&D abroad
rarely implies the shut-down of a lab at home, and is rather accompanied by an
expansion of the firm’s R&D capacity (Hall 2011). R&D investments carried out
abroad can even have a ‘‘multiplier effect’’ with respect to the R&D invested at
home (Makino et al. 2002). This is particularly so in the case of technological
leaders that, unlike laggards, engage in foreign R&D to capture a larger share of
profits on the foreign market (Belderbos et al. 2008). More concretely, setting a
network of R&D centers and subsidiaries in different locations, and connecting
them through proper network linkages and technologies, can be the key for a
company to pursue large scale R&D investments, which could not be parceled out to
fit the capacity of the home labs (De Meyer 1993; Chen and Chen 1998). The
internationalization of R&D could also be beneficial for running large multi-
technology projects based on a multi-disciplinary kind of knowledge. This
knowledge is usually geographically dispersed and thus requires firms to tap into
different country and/or region-specific innovation systems (Gerybadze and Reger
1999; Gassmann and Von Zedtwitz 1998).
On the basis of the previous arguments, FDI in R&D can be seen as a strategic
leverage through which MNCs compete with their global rivals for the leadership in
the realm of R&D investments, and for the gains this leadership entails (Sect. 2.1).
More precisely, by investing more in R&D abroad, MNCs can have higher
opportunities and capacities than their rivals to afford the largest R&D investments
on a global scale, that is, of being a top world R&D spender. Furthermore, FDI in
R&D could also be useful for the leaders to keep their leadership over time by
resisting the efforts of the R&D laggards to move them away from the top positions;
the competitive process is inherently dynamic. We thus put forward our first,
twofold research hypothesis:
HP1 FDI in R&D are expected to positively affect the firm’s capacity to: (1.a)
join the circle of the top R&D spenders; (1.b) remain within it over time.
It should be noted that this hypothesis refers to a possible increase of FDI in
R&D that MNCs can implement in two ways, either through a higher number of
R&D projects or through R&D projects of larger size. Drawing eclectically on the
literature on the margins of trade and FDI (e.g. Head and Ries 2008), we could refer
to the first case as an ‘extensive’ strategy of R&D internationalization. Strictly
speaking, a strategy of this kind would require that the higher number of projects
come with a wider geographical dispersion of their host countries. Still, even
without controlling for this important aspect, actually out of the paper’s scope, and
thus even with a certain geographical concentration, a ‘thicker’ portfolio of R&D
projects (i.e. a generic collection of FDI projects), could support HP1 in an
extensive fashion. That is, by providing MNCs with both economies of scope, by
spreading common R&D costs across different horizontal R&D activities, and
economies of scale, by specializing in different vertical R&D activities through
international labor division. Once more eclectically, HP1 could be thought at the
intensive margin, by referring to MNCs which invest abroad more largely in terms
of total value of their own projects. In this latter case, the underlying mechanism
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would be represented by economies of scale in foreign R&D and by the capacity of
overcoming eventual indivisibilities in exploiting R&D expenditure abroad
Carrying on with our research hypotheses, an impact on the global competition
for the R&D leadership can also be expected from FDI in other activities than R&D,
such as manufacturing activities as such, if not even service ones (e.g. marketing).
In these cases the channels through which FDI can increase the scale of the firm’s
operations in R&D is less direct, but still important. First of all, FDI could matter in
this respect when they are resource seeking, that is driven by the MNCs’ search for
particular types of resources that are not available at home, in absolute terms or at
convenient relative prices (Dunning 1993). Even when we leave apart those
technological and innovation management capabilities that fall more naturally in the
knowledge seeking category (Franco et al. 2010), other international resources can
in fact represent crucial complementary assets for the implementation of large R&D
projects by MNCs. This is particularly evident with respect to skilled labor, which
represents a crucial ‘asset’ that R&D intensive multinationals ‘seek’ for imple-
menting their innovation projects into economic activities on a global scale (Zanfei
2000). Similarly, in order to move along the innovation value-chain, the firm’s R&D
could require natural resources available in the international markets (think about
pharmaceutical and electronic MNCs in need of chemicals and semiconductors,
respectively), and for whose acquisition transaction costs and incomplete contracts
might make international trade inconvenient (e.g. in the form of outsourcing).
FDI in non-R&D activities can magnify the scale of the MNCs’ R&D
expenditure also when they are driven by a market seeking motivation Dunning
(1993). This motive can also drive FDI in R&D and amplifies their role for the issue
at stake. In general, a number of the international investments that MNCs carry out,
especially in manufacturing, are driven by their search for host markets of greater
dimensions and/or host markets of a special appeal in order to interact with key
foreign suppliers and customers, prevent potential competitors from entering and
supplying adjacent markets with goods and services [‘export-platform’ FDI
(Ekholm et al. 2003)]. In the former case, these FDI can provide the MNCs with
economies of scale that could lower the production costs of the outcomes of their
R&D projects and overcome eventual indivisibilities in doing so. In the latter case,
instead, the commercialization of the MNCs’ R&D outcomes could be facilitated by
economies of scope accruing by the exploitation of country-differences in consumer
tastes and supply capabilities.
FDI can be expected to impact on the MNCs’ capacity of undertaking R&D
investments also when they fragment and delocalize their production activities
following an efficiency seeking motivation. By exploiting cross-country differences
in production costs, as illustrated in the original taxonomy of Dunning (1993)4, as
well other efficiency enabling factors, like more efficient institutions (Campos and
Kinoshita 2003), privatization methods (Merlevede and Schoors 2005), and
agglomeration economies (Tan and Meyer 2011), MNCs could be able to reduce
4 As noted by Franco et al. (2010), from a conceptual point of view, the distinction between efficiency
seeking, on the one hand, and market and resource seeking FDI, on the other hand, is quite blurred, as the
latter points to mechanisms that are also present in the former.
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possible slacks in production and organization and free additional resources. These
later resources could be used to enlarge existing R&D projects, if not initiating new
ones.
Thinking of their manifold R&D impact, non-R&D FDI come to represent an
additional means through which MNCs can gain positions over their rivals for the
leadership of global innovative investments. A higher degree of internationalization
could actually provide firms with a wider and possibly better set of resources and
market conditions than the rivals for the economic sustainability of larger volumes
of R&D expenditures than theirs. Once more, a higher level of non-R&D
internationalization could also provide MNCs with efficient barriers against the
R&D laggards’ attempt of forging ahead.
This last set of arguments leads us to our second research hypothesis, which is
also twofold.
HP2 FDI in non-R&D activities are expected to positively affect the firm’s
capacity to: (1.a) join the circle of the top R&D spenders; (1.b) remain within
it over time.
A third hypothesis naturally emerges when we compare the different FDI
motivations and channels of impact that support HP1 and HP2. First of all, as we
said, while the effect of FDI projects in R&D on the technological competition we
are addressing is direct, that of non-R&D FDI is indirect. The latter effect works
through the acquisition of resources, which MNCs use complementary with the
innovation (R&D) investments that enable them to scale up R&D positions, and
which the former possibly reinforce. Secondly, FDI in R&D could be simulta-
neously used by MNCs for both knowledge and market (if not even, resource)
seeking and thus have a larger impact on their R&D capacity than non-R&D ones,
whose acquisition role of knowledge at the international level is limited. On this
basis, we expect that:
HP3 FDI in R&D activities are expected to have a larger effect than non-R&D
ones on the firm’s capacity to: (1.a) join the circle of the top R&D spenders;
(1.b) remain within it over time.
3 Empirical application
3.1 R&D and FDI company data
Two data sources are used for the empirical application. On the one hand, R&D
investments have been drawn form the EU Industrial R&D Investment (IRI)
Scoreboard (http://iri.jrc.ec.europa.eu/). This is a scoreboard analysis of top R&D
investors across the World, representing more than 80 % of the world business
R&D expenditure, that the Institute of Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS,
Joint Research Centre, European Commission) carries out annually since 2004. In
particular, company level data have been drawn for the R&D investments and for
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other accounting variables of the top 1,500 R&D investors over the period
2004–2011.
Scoreboard information has been matched with data from a second source, that is
fDi Markets, by fDi Intelligence (The Financial Times Ltd). The database tracks
cross-border greenfield investments, covering all sectors and countries worldwide
since 2003. In particular, information on investment activity (e.g. R&D, manufac-
turing, sale and marketing) and capital expenditure (Capex) of FDI projects has
been drawn from the database.5
In performing the merge between the two datasets, the FDI projects carried out
by the subsidiaries of a certain MNC have been assigned to the relative parent
company. In so doing, 1,150 scoreboard companies have been identified in fDi
Markets and thus retained for the empirical application. As Table 1 shows, in-
between 2003 and 2012, these top R&D spenders have invested in 33,572 FDI
projects. The largest number of them has been initiated in manufacturing (37.6 %),
followed by sales and marketing (14.6 %), and then R&D (11.7 %), pointing to a
pattern of internationalization of economic activities that is quite well known (e.g.
Karabag et al. 2011).
Although lower than in manufacturing and marketing/sales, the share of projects
in R&D is not negligible. It should also be noticed that, for the sake of our empirical
application, among these we have also considered the projects that fDi Markets
classifies as ‘‘Design, Development & Testing’’ projects as distinguished from
‘‘Research & Development’’. This is an empirical choice made by other studies
using the current database. It is motivated by the fact that knowledge sourcing
opportunities may arise at different stages of the research and development/
deployment chain of the innovative companies. A finer analysis of the R&D projects
mapped by fDi Markets has revealed among them the presence of foreign R&D labs
that carry out local development activities, and even adaptation activities of
products and technologies to local customers, in addition to pure research labs
(D’Agostino and Santangelo 2012). Still, the inclusion of FDI in design,
development and testing helps us in including further learning processes that occur
on the basis of research, trials-and-errors and feed-backs at lower stages of the
innovation chain. One should just think of the case of software companies, for
which the research and the testing of the product is nearly indistinguishable.
5 It should be noted that for a number of projects the Capex is estimated. The algorithm to fill Capex
missing information works as it follows: it first looks at projects in the same country/sector/activity with
actual Capex data and then removes the smallest and largest 5 % of projects in order to create an
estimation dataset. If there are less than 5 projects in this dataset, then the algorithm switch to regional
data (i.e. North America in the case of projects in Canada); if there are still less than 5 projects, then the
algorithm switch to global data (this would only be the case for rare combinations of sector/activity).
Where the Capex is known, the algorithm uses the estimation dataset to look at the average ratio of Capex
and to fill the gaps. These estimates are generally pretty accurate as the ratios in a given combination of
country/sector/activity are pretty standard. If the Capex is unknown, the algorithm uses the average values
of the dataset.
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3.2 The circles of top R&D investors
Looking for a threshold to identify the circle of top R&D investors at the worldwide
level is not an easy task. The IRI Scoreboard already identifies a threshold with this
aim, but it simply sets it up exogenously with a fixed number of ranked companies,
with respect to which it carries out the analysis over time. Apart from being
exogenous, the same threshold has appeared to separate from the non-Scoreboard
ones a number of companies whose innovative behavior and economic performance
are far from homogeneous. Kancs and Siliverstovs (2012), for example, have
recently shown that the relationship between R&D expenditures and productivity
growth of the Scoreboard companies is actually non-linear. Namely, the impact of
R&D on productivity growth becomes significantly positive only after a certain
critical mass of R&D is reached.
This kind of evidence seems to suggest that the ladder of companies that the
Scoreboard identifies is not that smooth in terms of levels of investments. On the
contrary, even when its 1,500th step has been climbed, further steps might emerge
along the ladder, whose height (size) can create discontinuities in benefiting from
R&D expenditure.
The distribution of the R&D expenditure of the Scoreboard companies against
their ranking position in the latest available year (2011) (Fig. 1) confirms this
expectation (the distribution for the other years is almost identical). The level of
R&D expenditure increases at an increasing pace approaching the top of the
ranking. The relationship between the companies ranking position and their R&D
Table 1 Distribution of FDI projects per economic activities
FDI activity # of projects %
Manufacturing 12,612 37.6
Sales, marketing support 4,909 14.6
Research & Development 3,918 11.7
Retail 2,795 8.3
Logistics, distribution transportation 1,808 5.4
Business services 1,655 4.9
Headquarters 1,290 3.8
ICT internet infrastructure 794 2.4
Maintenance servicing 671 2.0
Electricity 631 1.9
Customer contact centre 564 1.7
Education training 542 1.6
Extraction 509 1.5
Technical support centre 340 1.0
Shared services centre 297 0.9
Construction 162 0.5
Recycling 75 0.2
Total 33,572
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expenditure appears exponential, with the latter that starts to break off around the
500th rank position and takes then off around the 250th. In other words, in
correspondence of these two positions the R&D rate of change along the ranking
increases steeply, suggesting these to be the most important posts (not to say
discontinuities) for leaders to let the followers at a safer distance.
It should be noticed that, while the 250th cut-off is actually close to the average
of the R&D distribution (reached by the 265th position), generally used in the
literature for discriminating R&D leaders from the followers, the 500th one appears
more selective than the median position (the 750th), also used for the same scope. In
order to test whether the thresholds derived from the data are more informative than
the standard ones, we have regressed the R&D growth rates along the sample
ranking against a dummy for each of ‘our’ candidate positions and for the average
and the median ones. Table 2 compares the relative R2 and F statistics, revealing
that, in both cases, our thresholds explain a larger part of the variance of the R&D
growth rates and provide a better fit to the data under analysis. Accordingly, the
250th and the 500th positions have been chosen as boundaries of the (two)
circle(s) of top R&D investors we are looking for.
Let us observe that the identified thresholds actually discriminate our Scoreboard
companies in a way which is consistent with our theoretical premises. First of all,
Table 3 shows that the identified groups actually concentrate the bulk of the R&D
expenditure, both at the beginning and at the end of the period. In 2011, the top 250
companies carried out about 72 % of the total R&D expenditure, with a median
value of 854 millions. When we consider the top 500, the share over the total R&D
expenditures raises up to about 82 %, with a concomitant decline in the median
value (366). Companies below the 500 ranking position display on average a much
lower level of R&D expenditure. Similar patterns can be observed in 2004 (our first
year sample period), when R&D expenditures were even more concentrated.
More relevant is the fact that in 2011, for which we were able to obtain reliable
figures only6, the market capitalization per employee (MktCap/Emp) of the (median)
Scoreboard companies increases by moving up along the ladder (top 250: 0.33; top
500: 0.25; other companies: 0.23). This confirms the prize of R&D market value
already found by Cincera et al. (2009) and the argument according to which, when a
company is a top spender, investors are inclined to discount a positive relation
between higher R&D capital and subsequent stock returns (Lev and Sougiannis
1996).
Quite interestingly, in both 2004 and 2011, the (median) R&D investors of the
top circles in the ladder show better performances than (that of the) followers in
terms of two variables usually taken into account for the impact of innovation on:
the firm’s competitive advantage over the rivals (e.g. Nakao 1993)—that is,
operating profit per employee (OpProf/Emp)—and the (labor) productivity of its
economic activities (e.g. Ortega et al. 2011)—that is, net sales per employee (Sales/
Emp). These advantages are consistent with those we have hypothesized in
Sect. 2.1.
6 For 2004 we do not have enough available data on market capitalization to calculate representative
figures.
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3.3 Entry-exit and top R&D circles: model and econometric strategy
In order to model the entry and exit with respect to the top R&D circles, we draw
eclectically on previous studies in industrial organization, which address a similar
competitive dynamics with respect to markets with different structures and degrees
of firm heterogeneity (e.g. Lieberman 1989; Berry and Reiss 2007). For each
company i ¼ 1; . . .; N, at time t ¼ 1; . . .; T , we accordingly define entry and exit as
the outcome of a Markov process, where yit ¼ 1 indicates that the company has a
level of R&D spending sufficiently high to be in the ladders’ circle, and yit ¼ 0
otherwise. The conditional distribution of company’s i R&D expenditure, assumed
independent across firms, is then given by:
0
20
00
40
00
60
00
80
00
R
&D
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 2
01
1
250 500 750 1000 1250 1500
R&D rank 2011
Fig. 1 Ranking and R&D expenditures
Table 2 Testing the thresholds on R&D growth-rates along the ranking
250th Average (265th) 500th Median (750th)
Threshold 0.0104***
(0.000)
0.0099***
(0.000)
0.0065***
(0.000)
0.0047***
(0.000)
R-squared 0.270 [0.260 0.171 [0.101
F-test 553.7 [525.5 309.1 [167.7
Standard errors in parentheses— *** p \ 0.01, ** p \ 0.05, * p \ 0.1
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pi;vju ¼ Pðyit ¼ vjyit1 ¼ uÞ ð1Þ
where pi;vju is the probability of a transition from the state u ¼ 0; 1 at time t  1 to
the state v ¼ 0; 1 at time t.7
Let us define xi  ð1; xi1; . . .; xipÞ0 as the vector of p covariates for the ith
company, which affect the transition from state u to state v, and let buv 
ðb0uv; b1uv; . . .; bpuvÞ0 be the vector of parameters for the same transition. The
transition probabilities in terms of conditional probabilities as functions of
covariates x are:
pi;vjuðxÞ ¼ Pðyit ¼ vjyit1 ¼ u; xÞ ¼ expðb
0
uvxitÞP
uv expðb0uvxitÞ
: ð2Þ
By imposing that b00 ¼ 0 and b11 ¼ 0, the transition probability from being below
the threshold and staying below (and being and staying above) the threshold in the
next period can be written as:
pi;v¼uðxÞ ¼ 1
1 þPu6¼v expðb0uvxitÞ ð3Þ
and the probabilities of crossing the threshold as:
pi;v 6¼uðxÞ ¼ expðb
0
uvxitÞ
1 þPu 6¼v expðb0uvxitÞ
: ð4Þ
Once conditioned on the covariates, the transition probabilities are assumed to be
independent across companies and time, and we can retrieve both the transition
matrix and the impact of the FDI determinants via maximum likelihood estimation.
Table 3 R&D distribution and descriptive statistics by ranking groups (Million Euros)
R&D
expenditure
Sample
%
Mean Median Median Median Median
(total) R&D R&D R&D MktCap/
Emp
OpProf/
Emp
NSales/
Emp
2011
Top 250 384,927 71.7 1,540 854 0.333 0.035 0.318
Top 500 442,433 82.4 885 366 0.253 0.023 0.259
Others (501–1,500) 94,648 17.6 40 29 0.227 0.015 0.222
Whole sample 537,081 189 38 0.241 0.017 0.235
2004
Top 250 264,590 81.5 1,058 469 – 0.027 0.281
Top 500 295,672 91.1 676 243 – 0.020 0.236
Others (501–1,500) 28,843 8.9 23 17 – 0.014 0.187
Whole sample 324,514 184 28 – 0.016 0.202
7 Note that
P
v¼0;1 pi;vju ¼ 1; u ¼ 0; 1.
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More precisely, we estimate a system of two logistic regressions, one for the
entry and the other for the exit process, via Seemingly Unrelated Estimation (SUE).
This approach allows us to retrieve both robust standard errors and estimates of the
between-model covariances of the parameters, and thus to test for differences (in the
absolute values of the parameters) in the two equations. For those covariates that
provide a significant contribution in explaining both the entry and exit dynamics, we
will test whether they exert symmetric effects on the two processes.
In order to test our three research hypothesis (Sect. 2.2), we plug in vector x the
involvement of the company in outward FDI projects. As a first step to attenuate the
problem of endogeneity that could affect the use of FDI as a regressor for entry/exit
in the R&D circles, we take stock of the dynamic nature of our data and introduce a
time-lag between the latter and the former. In this way, we factually prevent a
reverse causality from belonging to the circles to investing abroad. In order not to
lose an excessive number of observations, we assume that one year of time could be
enough for an FDI project to have an effect on the R&D expenditure of the investing
firm, and thus refer to FDI at time t  1 for entry and exit at time t. The green-field
nature of the FDI projects collected in the fDi Market database, whose
implementation presumably urges a more prompt and substantial injection of fresh
R&D resources than a M&A project, makes this ‘early’ impact hypothesis not so
prohibitive to support. Of course, other sources of endogeneity could still remain,
that only randomised controlled experiments could satisfactorily solve (Reeb et al.
2012). As we will say in the following, in the absence of a suitable counter-factual
group, we will however resort to the more standard, tough imperfect, technique of
controlling for other variables and sources of unobserved heterogeneity in the
relationship at stake.
The previous methodology is applied in two classes of models. In Model 1, we
assume that the probability that a company i enters in (Model 1.1), and exits from
(Model 1.2), the circle at time t, pi;tð1j0Þ (pi;tð0j1Þ) is affected by the number of its FDI
projects in R&D at time t  1 (FDIrdt1), and we thus refer to the extensive kind of
R&D internationalization we have discussed in Sect. 2.2. Following a similar
extensive logic for the firm’s internationalization at large, in Model 2, entry in
(Model 2.1) and exit from (Model 2.2) the identified circles at time t are explained
by adding to FDIrdt1 the number of FDI projects carried out in non-R&D activities
at time t  1 (FDInonrdt1). As a robustness check of the previous one, Model 3
refers to what in Sect. 2.2 we have called R&D internationalization at the intensive
margin. The determinants of entry (Model 3.1) and exit (Model 3.2) are thus
investigated by replacing FDIrdt1 with the total capital expenditure in R&D
projects by company i at time t  1 (FDIrdexpt1), using FDInonrdt1 as control for
the internationalization degree of the focal firm.
In all the models we have to consider that, in addition to FDI projects, the process
of entry/exit with respect to the circle of top R&D investors could be affected also
by other variables, which should enter the x vector too. First of all, companies might
climb up and down the R&D ladder depending on their availability of financial
resources to invest in R&D, providing an interesting opportunity for testing a
relationship on which the evidence is still not unambiguous (Hundley et al. 1996). In
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this vein, the operating profit of the firms (OpProf ) is considered among the
regressors of all the previous three models.
Further explanatory variables emerge by drawing eclectically on industrial
organization also for the determinants it has found for firm entry and exit with
respect to ‘‘standard’’ markets. First of all, the capacity of being and staying among
the R&D leaders could depend on the firm’s size, with the possibility of extending
to this realm the evidence of a ‘‘liability of smallness’’ (Aldrich and Auster 1986;
Honjo 2000). Accordingly, the natural logarithm of the company’s employees
(LogðEmpÞ) is inserted among the controls. In the same vein, the age of the firm
(Age) could affect its potential of scaling up the thresholds of the R&D worldwide
ranking, as well as the risk of falling below them over time: the equivalent of a
‘‘liability of newness’’ becomes thus interesting to test (Stinchcombe 2000; Geroski
1995).
A series of dummies complete the list of controls, in order to take into account
industry, country and time specificities. As we said, in order to overcome potential
endogeneity problems, all the variables apart from LogðEmpÞ and Age, and of
course the dummies, enter into the model with a year lag.
4 Results
In general, the estimation results provide us with support to our research hypotheses.
However, important and interesting specifications emerge across the two considered
circles of top R&D spenders and across the estimated models.
4.1 Top 500 R&D spenders
Starting with the extensive kind of internationalization that the number of projects
enable us to consider (that is, FDIrdt1), and looking at the lower in rank of the two
circles (Table 4), our first research hypothesis about the role of FDI in R&D
(Sect. 2.2) gets confirmed in both of its two parts. A larger number of international
R&D projects significantly increases the firm’s probability of entering into the
group of the top 500 R&D spenders (Model 1.1), thus supporting HP1a.
Furthermore, it significantly reduces the risk of exiting from the same group in
the aftermath of the same projects (Model 1.2), consistently with HP1b.8
This is a first interesting result. It adds new evidence on the advantages that
companies can have when, through R&D FDI, they can seek knowledge and other
resources internationally for their innovative projects, and/or look for international
markets where to exploit the relative results. Through these international activities
firms can afford to pursue the largest R&D investments at the worldwide level, and
to compete for the markets and technologies which require such a large R&D
involvement, for example, because of the presence of up-front fixed costs and
indivisibilities. On the other hand, drawing more extensively than the other R&D
8 As reported at the bottom of the estimation tables, tests on the coefficients prevent us from retaining as
significant apparent differences between those for entry and exit.
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giants on international markets for their R&D activities, firms are also able to renew
their knowledge base and to better resist the competition for the technological
leadership at stake.
Looking at the first circle of top R&D spenders, our second research hypothesis
gets confirmed only partially. On the one hand, the access to the top 500 R&D
investors is also helped by a larger number of FDI projects in activities other than
R&D, FDInonrdt1 (Model 2.1). Although with a lower level of significance, HP2a
appears to be supported. Moreover, the size of the coefficient for R&D FDI does not
change with respect to Model 1.1. This is a second interesting result of our
application, which points to a possible role of ‘complementary’ international
activities to R&D ones for firms to reach the leadership for the largest R&D
investments: investing abroad in search of resources and/or markets might provide
firms with an R&D advantage, even when this occurs in other activities than R&D.
The degree of internationalization that firms acquire by setting up new subsidiaries
abroad, irrespectively from their dedication to innovation-related activities,
apparently increases their set of knowledge and market opportunities, to the point
of spurring a shift to a larger scale of R&D investments in order to exploit them.
On the other hand, a greater internationalization of activities other than R&D
does not help the R&D giants in resisting the competition for the leadership; on the
contrary, the number of FDI projects in R&D (FDIrdt1) does (Model 2.2): HP2b is
not confirmed. While a wider access to international markets for the sake of R&D
helps the leaders to stay in the top-500 circle, a larger number of international
activities per se does not guarantee safer positions in it. Once they got into the
circle, companies need to resort to more research-related international strategies for
resisting the competition of the new large-R&D comers.
This last result provides indirect support to our HP3b, with respect to which the
lower exit impact of non-R&D FDI is actually a not significant one vs. the
significant impact of R&D FDI. HP3a is instead directly supported, given the lower
impact of FDInonrd with respect to FDIrd (Model 2.1). As expected, a larger
portfolio of international R&D projects helps more, rather than a larger portfolio of
other international economic activities, in climbing the R&D ladder. As we argued
in Sect. 2.2, the former provides more direct and extensive advantages in terms of
R&D expenditure than the latter.
In this last respect, let us also observe that, as Fig. 2 shows (solid lines), the
estimated probabilities of entering in the circle of the top 500 sharply increase with
the number of R&D projects (upper part of the figure), and approach a certainty kind
of outcome (that is a unitary probability) already for the companies with the lowest
numbers of projects, revealing a kind of logistic distribution. Conversely, the
estimated probabilities of joining the same group increase much more smoothly,
with the increase in the number of non-R&D FDI (lower part of the figure). As we
said, unlike an R&D based one, a general internationalization strategy, whose
knowledge outcome can be only indirectly functional to R&D investments, appears
less powerful in guaranteeing the status of top spenders.
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4.2 Top 250 R&D spenders
The previous results are nearly completely confirmed when we look at the R&D
spenders’ dynamics with respect to the upper threshold, that is the 250th position
(Table 5), and considering the number of projects (that is, FDIrdt1). Increasing the
number of FDI in R&D still appears a significant strategy for gaining (Model 1.1)
and maintaining (Model 1.2) the access to the very top of the worldwide ranking in
Fig. 2 Estimated probabilities of entering in the top 500 & 250 circles
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terms of R&D expenditure, providing support for both HP1a and HP1b. As Fig. 2
(upper part) shows, and as expected, reaching this upper circle through R&D
internationalization is more difficult than reaching the lower circle, at least for the
companies with a smaller portfolio of R&D projects: the first part of the dotted
sigmoid is shifted downward with respect to the solid one. Still, setting FDI in R&D
projects at work helps with that. Along with evidence on the 500th position, this
result provides a general support to our first research hypothesis: the internation-
alization of R&D activities via FDI can have a significant impact on the competition
for the largest R&D expenditures.
The entry/exit dynamics with respect to the higher 250 spenders also support our
second research hypothesis, about the role of FDI in activities other than R&D.
Once more, the support is partial and limited to the access to this higher group
(Model 2.1), which is significantly fostered by FDInonrd, consistently with HP2a.
This time, however, the explaining power of FDIrd does not keep its original size
(as from Model 1.1) but slightly diminishes, pointing to a lower complementarity
between the two kinds of FDI when the target is the highest circle along the R&D
ladder.
Also in this case, the comparison between the upper and lower part of Fig. 2 (red
lines) suggests that widening the portfolio of non-R&D international projects
increases the entry-probabilities in the group much more smoothly than widening
that of R&D projects. Furthermore, the same internationalization strategy is much
less powerful than that of targeting the top 500. The dotted line stands quite below
the solid line in the lower part of the figure. Quite interestingly, the divide between
the two curves is larger than in the upper part of the same figure, suggesting that the
‘escalating power’ of non-R&D FDI gets more substantially exhausted than that of
R&D FDI.
Our second research hypothesis is instead not confirmed when we look at the exit
dynamics from the group of the top 250, that is at HP2b (Model 2.2). Similarly to
the top 500, a generic increase of the internationalization degree of the sample
companies is not enough (significant) for protecting them against the competition of
new large R&D comers, which apparently requires more research-based interna-
tional activities.
Finally, also with respect to the top 250, the comparative effect of FDIrd and
FDInonrd on entry and exit confirms both HP3a—directly, with an impact of
0:5644 and 0:0463, respectively—and HP3b—indirectly, with a 0:3591 and a
non-significant impact, respectively.
4.3 Robustness checks and controls
As a sort of robustness check of our previous results, Table 6 reports the estimates
of another class of entry-exit models (Models 3.1 and 3.2) where, instead of the
number of R&D projects (FDIrdt1), the internationalization of R&D activities is
examined by looking at the total capital expenditure in R&D projects by company
(FDIrdexpt1), using FDInonrdt1 as control. In so doing, as we argued in Sect. 2.2,
we aimed at addressing what we eclectically called the effect of an intensive
internationalization of R&D.
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Looking at the first threshold (top 500 R&D spenders), our first research
hypothesis is fully supported (i.e. HP1a and HP1b). Once we control for their
internationalization degree in other activities (FDInonrd), the firms with higher
investments in international projects in R&D (FDIrdexp) get similar gains than
those with the most numerous R&D international projects: the probability of joining
the top 500 increases (Model 3.1), as well as that of remaining among them (Model
3.2). As in the previous models, a higher internationalization degree in non-R&D
activities only helps in entering the top 500, confirming a partial support to our
second hypothesis (i.e. HP2a, but not HP2b).9
The result we have obtained with respect to FDIrdexp is another interesting
outcome of our application, which suggests an additional and possibly more
expected channel through which the internationalization of R&D can help firms to
compete for the leadership in the volumes of R&D expenditure. While Models 1 and
2 tell us that a strategy of pervasive R&D internationalization could be enough for
climbing the R&D giants’ shoulders, Model 3 tells us that the intensity of the R&D
internationalization also matters. As we said, setting in motion international
‘innovative’ projects of larger amounts could actually enable companies to
overcome the indivisibilities that often prevent them from implementing R&D
investments.
The significance of scale effects in the internationalization of R&D is confirmed
also when we look at the higher of our R&D circles (i.e. the top 250), but with an
important element of differentiation. As in the previous case, larger FDI in R&D
makes entry in the top-250 circle easier (Model 3.1). However, unlike the previous
case, higher R&D investments in international projects do not make the top 250
more ‘sticky’ (Model 3.2). Once this part of the R&D ‘iceberg’ is reached,
economies of scale in research stop constituting a reliable safeguard against the risk
of falling down out. At the same level, it is only an extensive (in the way we meant
it) internationalization of R&D, possibly more inclined to a diversification mode,
that can help in staying within the group.
In concluding our analysis, some interesting results emerge from the analysis of
the controls used in the estimation, across all of its specifications (Tables 4, 5, and
6). First of all, as expected, larger firms are more prone to make the shifts along the
R&D ladder. Conversely, the smaller ones are more inclined to exit from the R&D
circles at stake, pointing to an interesting extension of the hypothesis of the
‘‘liability of smallness’’ in industrial dynamics. No significant effect is instead found
for the extension of the ‘‘liability of newness’’ to our realm. The coefficients
attached to the variable Age are not statistically significant (apart from one case at
10 %): once the effects of the other variables are taken into account, the age of a
company does not contribute in explaining its capacity of climbing the R&D giants’
shoulders. In this specific realm, the higher opportunities which are usually
recognized to younger firms in industrial dynamics do not seem to matter. Entry-in
and exit-from the R&D circle do not seem an issue of industrial demography.
9 Given the different nature of the variables we use in this robustness check for R&D and non-R&D FDI,
HP3 is not directly testable in this case.
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Finally, the companies’ profitability has a significant effect on the probability to
enter into the top-500 circle, and the same holds true, for the probability of staying
in the more restricted top-250 circle. The availability of internal financial resources,
by relaxing the financial constraints that companies may face when investment
decisions are taken, could explain the first result. As for the second, instead, an
expected higher financial performance of the top 250 might lower the importance of
the cash-flows availability for R&D investment decisions. However, more cash-flow
could be needed to keep an open window on the new opportunities in the market.
5 Conclusions
In a global scenario, innovation competition also entails struggling for the
leadership in large R&D investments on a worldwide scale. Climbing the ladder of
the world R&D spenders can help firms to pool the risks of different research
projects and/or overcome the indivisibilities that affect the use of R&D resources,
especially in the discovery of path–breaking, brand new products and processes.
The internationalization of R&D through FDI can help in this respect, as
multinational projects of this kind enable companies to access new knowledge
sources for their technologies and discover new markets for their development.
Although less directly, an impact on the firm’s capacity to compete for the circles of
the top R&D expenditure worldwide can also be expected from other international
activities, through which MNCs can search for markets and complementary
resources for implementing their larger R&D projects.
Our application to the companies of the European Scoreboard of Industrial
Research and Innovation generally confirms these hypotheses, shedding new lights
on the innovation advantages of internationalization. FDI in R&D give a significant
and positive contribution to climb on the R&D giants’ shoulders: a contribution that
also take place through the economies of scale that larger foreign R&D entail, but
which is not necessarily related only to them. A large portfolio of projects of this
kind can work equally well. To be sure, only the number of foreign R&D projects
guarantees to the investing firm to keep their leadership in R&D. On the contrary, a
larger R&D expenditure abroad stops working when the very top of the worldwide
ladder is reached.
From the previous results, a first set of policy implications can be drawn about
the support to the internationalization of R&D. First of all, while R&D offshoring
could possibly have the drawbacks that the literature has pointed to—for example,
the risk of losing core-competencies and of international knowledge leakage—by
helping firms source R&D knowledge internationally (for example, through
initiatives of international knowledge transfer and/or qualified labor mobility and
exchanges of researchers), policy makers can provide them with important
opportunities. On the one hand, they could help MNCs in affording those critical
levels of R&D investments from which the most path-breaking innovation outcomes
often follow, with the biggest economic returns. On the other hand, supporting the
internationalization of R&D, though mainly in terms of wider projects portfolios,
policy makers could provide firms with a longer temporal window among the top
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R&D spenders, thus augmenting the opportunities to exploit the acquired
knowledge into successful innovations. Of course, additional factors are responsible
for the transformation of the R&D global leadership, addressed in this paper, into
prospected returns. However, we deem that the same leadership would represent an
important, if not even conditional, characteristic for companies to achieve
successful innovation outcomes on a global scale: an issue that we postpone to
our future research agenda.
Further policy implications stem from the fact that also FDI projects in activities
other than R&D could support the firms in the international technological
competition at stake. As expected, their impact is lower than that of FDI in R&D
for accessing the top R&D circles, while it even vanishes with respect to the firm’s
capacity of resisting the competition of the new R&D comers. Still, this is an
important result, with a relevant policy implication. Supporting the international-
ization of companies through outward FDI could have a side-effect on their overall
R&D capacity. Not only can it increase the domestic investments of MNCs in R&D,
as the extant literature has found. But it can also help the firms to reach a critical
R&D mass, which the literature has shown important for a positive evaluation by
the financial markets, and which can be used in high-scale intensive projects with
larger economic returns.
Of course, the paper does not come without reservations, which future research
on the topic will try to address. First of all, the empirical application does not make
use yet of information on the geographical location of the host countries, which
would make the identification of the FDI motivations more accurate. A similar
improvement could be obtained by further disaggregating the activities other than
R&D that have been internationalized by the sampled firms. In terms of
methodology, the set of research hypotheses put forward could be further enriched
by enhancing the micro-structure of the entry–exit model.
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